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I. Introduction
Security relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea, like those of 
any other two closely entwined neighbors, glisten with the multiple facets 
of complexity. A number of structural conditions and recent political actions 
underscore areas favoring bilateral cooperation. Both countries are political 
democracies with sophisticated economies; they have numerous similarities in 
their policy profi les and political constrictions that spring from that mixture. The 
two were on the same side during the Cold War and each has a strong security tie 
with the United States that includes extensive basing of U.S. military forces on 
the two countries’ soil. Unlike most European democracies that were skeptical 
of the George W. Bush administration’s case for invading Iraq, Japan and Korea 
dutifully dispatched national forces as participants in America’s “coalition of the 
willing.” The two have a deep and broad trading relationship, and each country 
sends large numbers of students, tourists, and businesspeople to the other’s 
country. A prior ban on Japanese music, books, and fi lms was lifted in Korea 
starting in 1998 while the Japanese public went through a crazed fascination 
with incoming Korean soap opera, including one of its leading men, Bae Yong-
joon (Yon-sama to his bedazzled, largely middle-aged female fans in Japan). 
The youth of both countries are gluttonous consumers of the latest pop culture 
products from the other. In short, considerable connectedness across a range 
of military, economic, and cultural arenas could stimulate a positive security 
relationship.
And indeed, at their second summit following Korean president Lee Myung-
bak’s inauguration in April 2008, he and outgoing Japanese prime minister 
Fukuda Yasuo pledged among other things “to build a future-oriented Korea-
Japan relationship and a mature partnership based on pragmatic diplomacy.” 
They further agreed to enhance cooperation in dealing with the North Korean 
nuclear issue and the North’s abduction of Japanese citizens, to expand bilateral 
exchanges with a particular concentration on the youth of both countries, and to 
hold working-level consultations aimed at restarting stalled negotiations toward a 
bilateral economic partnership agreement. Lee set aside a special economic zone 
for Japanese manufacturing investment while Fukuda invited Lee to participate 
in the July 2008 Group of Eight summit as he also expressed his hope to visit 
Korea in the second half of the year for additional summit talks.
Powerful contradictory evidence, however, underscores the frequently contentious 
security relationship between the two. In April–May 2006, for example, Seoul 
dispatched 20 gunboats to prevent a planned Japanese survey of the waters around 
the Liancourt Rocks (called Dokdo in Korea; Takeshima in Japan), islets claimed 
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by both countries and currently under Korean administration (PINR 2006). Japan 
has signed on to participate in the controversial ballistic missile defense system 
being installed by the United States across Northeast Asia; Korea has opted out. 
Similarly, Seoul has declined to participate in the Proliferation Security Initiative 
(PSI), a sea-borne interdiction system led by the U.S. Navy and involving 11 
or more countries. PSI is designed to prevent the secret transfer of weapons of 
mass destruction. Japan and Korea have typically taken dramatically different 
positions regarding the DPRK’s nuclear ambitions, with the ROK, under Kim 
Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, pursuing a decade-long Sunshine Policy focused 
on economic engagement. Japan, in contrast, has invoked harsh sanctions against 
the North, implementing restrictions often tougher than those called for by United 
Nations resolutions. Japan’s National Defense Program Guidelines identifi es the 
DPRK as a potential military threat, while the ROK has done all it can to treat 
the North less as a military threat and more as a potential partner for brotherly 
reunifi cation. In the six-party talks, Japan has voiced regular and throaty demands 
for a “full accounting” of the status of Japanese citizens abducted by the DPRK 
during the 1970s and 1980s. In contrast, the ROK, despite having lost multiply 
more South Koreans to abduction by the North than Japan, has rarely raised the 
issue, fearing that to do so would worsen North-South bilateral efforts.
In short, despite many reasons why Japan and Korea should fi nd themselves 
on similar sides of most issues, the reality is that they frequently view their 
respective security situations though completely contradictory lenses. Ironically, 
it has been during the post–Cold War years, during which both countries found 
themselves on the “winning side,” that the differences between the two countries 
have become even more contentious. The reasons for this are the contradictory 
directions taken by the two countries after the straitjacket of the Cold War gave 
each country enhanced strategic fl exibility. And not surprisingly, the directions 
taken by each have shown the growing infl uence of domestic political factors, 
often overriding security considerations.
II. Changing Security Postures
The end of the Cold War has dovetailed with changes in the domestic politics of 
both Japan and the ROK, which in turn have produced two alternative security 
postures. Many aspects of this mutual repositioning have resulted in the two 
countries moving further apart and holding differing perspectives on their 
respective security situations along with relations with one another. Of particular 
importance is the fact that, since the end of the Cold War, the two countries have 
moved in quite different directions with regard to their respective ties with the 
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United States, China, and the DPRK. These new positions have left the two 
countries with exaggerated differences and antagonistic strategic profi les.
Japan
Consider Japan fi rst. Throughout the Cold War, Japanese domestic politics and 
foreign policy were effectively driven by a one-party dominant regime. The pro-
U.S. Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) enjoyed comfortable majorities in both 
houses of parliament and consequently was able to fi ll virtually all cabinet posts 
and to implement most of its desired policy directions from 1955 until the party 
split in 1993. Passing legislation was often frustrating and complicated, but when 
the chips were down the LDP almost always had the required votes to ensure 
passage of its programs. The major opposition party, the Japan Socialist Party 
(JSP), was particularly critical of Japan’s defense posture, its close ties with the 
United States, and anything that challenged the so-called peace constitution. But 
the JSP never gained control of as many as one-third of the seats in parliament, 
making the party a frequently toothless opposition (Pempel 1998; Scheiner 
2006 inter alia).
Throughout the Cold War, Japan was a reliably pro-U.S. ally but one that also 
relied heavily on the widespread public support for pacifi sm so as to resist 
spending more than the talismanic 1 percent of GNP on its own military. Japan 
equally strongly resisted U.S. calls to dispatch Japanese forces abroad or to 
provide “boots on the ground” for U.S. operations. This was most clear during 
the fi rst invasion of Iraq in 1990 when Japan’s huge $13 billion “contribution” 
was widely disdained as mere “checkbook diplomacy.”
During this time, Japan’s primary policy focus involved economic development, 
and the stunning geometric expansion of its GNP provided consistent quarterly 
testimony to the success of its government-business cooperation. Both 
government and business kept their collective eyes on the target of national 
economic development while leaving hard-core security matters largely to the 
U.S. military, the Seventh Fleet, and the nuclear umbrella.
Japan’s security profi le involved balancing against excessive dependence on 
the U.S. military in at least two ways. First, although the United States has 
traditionally defi ned security almost exclusively in military terms, Japan has 
opted for what it labels a “comprehensive security” [sôgô anzen hoshô] or what 
Hughes and Fukushima (2004, 61–63) have referred to as “bilateralism plus.” 
Resource poor and late to industrialize, Japan has continually been forced to 
confront its gnawing dependency on foreign imports of raw materials and its 
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inescapable vulnerability to economic shocks from abroad (Pyle and Heginbotham 
2001, 77). Formally articulated by Prime Minister Ōhira Masayoshi in 1980, 
the doctrine initially centered on Japan’s need to cope in an integrated fashion 
with a range of nonmilitary challenges to its national well-being coming from 
economic, environmental, food, energy, pandemic, and illegal drug challenges, 
among others. It subsequently was expanded to include Japan’s active pursuit 
of a multidimensional and positive approach to the achievement of national 
security.
The second balance to Japan’s high security dependence on the United States 
involved the country’s ongoing policy efforts to foster positive ties with East 
Asia. Foreign and technological aid and corporate investment complemented 
systematic government efforts at normalizing relations between Japan and its 
neighbors while simultaneously creating a hedge against excessive reliance on 
the U.S. market.
This security profi le changed fundamentally during the “regime shift” that Japan 
has been undergoing since the early 1990s (Pempel 1998). The economic bubble 
that had given Japan such an aura of unrivaled prosperity during the last half of 
the 1980s burst with a bang and ushered in an 18-year-long “lost decade” that 
has still not been concluded by a return to high growth, expanding capital and 
labor productivity, and regularized employment. As the economy nosedived, 
the LDP split, losing its governing majority with the result that a crazy-quilt 
combination of opposition parties controlled the levers of government for nine 
months. Only after that did a weakened LDP return to government, which it has 
controlled—in coalition—ever since.
Within this maelstrom of change, Japan’s military strategy underwent a series of 
previously unimaginable changes, most conspicuously during the overlapping 
administrations of Koizumi Junichiro and George W. Bush. Following the 11 
September 2001 attacks on the United States by al Qaeda operatives, Koizumi 
was quick to snuggle into a demonstrably closer embrace of the United States and 
its military activities. Through a series of domestic legislative changes, Koizumi 
gained permission to dispatch several Maritime Self-Defense Force ships to the 
Indian Ocean in support of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. He subsequently 
sent some 500 Japanese troops to Iraq. The former Japanese Defense Agency 
saw its legal status boosted as it became a full-fl edged ministry. New defense 
plans were no longer marked by prior timidity and a narrow defi nition of defense 
but instead were characterized by an emphasis on power projection, amphibious 
capabilities, force transformation, and improved command and control (Hughes 
2005, 122; Samuels 2007).
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A new military outline in 2004 also broke precedent by explicitly identifying 
China and the DPRK as potential security concerns to Japan while stressing the 
country’s need to deal with both ballistic missile and guerrilla attacks rather than 
the previously planned-for invasions. New too was a recalibration of activities 
involving Japanese airspace and territorial waters. Geographically, Japan’s 
security interests were overtly expanded from defense of the home islands to 
encompass a larger mission that included international security, international 
peacekeeping, and counterterrorism as key targets of Japan’s overall national 
defense strategy. To meet these newly identifi ed threats, Japan, it was argued, 
needed a new “multifunctional,” military capability with a centralized SDF 
command and a rapid reaction force” (Pempel 2006; 2008a). In addition, Japan’s 
Coast Guard was substantially upgraded, though technically the JCG is not a 
military body (Samuels 2007/2008).
The United States was, during this time, also redefi ning its security mission to 
put more emphasis on logistical fl exibility by shifting from its prior reliance on 
fi xed bases to ward off predictably styled attacks from presumed opponents. And 
Koizumi embraced these changes as well. He chose to join the United States in 
its missile defense program, to allow the stationing of the U.S. Army’s I Corps 
headquarters in Japan, thereby linking Japan more closely to U.S. global, as 
opposed to Japanese, security strategy. He also joined with the United States in 
articulating a policy of calculated ambiguity over Taiwan and how Japan would 
react to potential Chinese hostilities toward the island’s government.
Koizumi’s robust embrace of Bush’s security activities was paralleled by a 
distinctive turn away from Asia, most especially following his visit to Pyongyang 
in September 2002. That visit, designed to begin the process of normalization of 
bilateral Japan-DPRK relations, led to what Koizumi and his advisers anticipated 
would be a North Korean apology about the abductees program maintained by 
the North in the 1970s and 1980s. The apology was made, but instead of easing 
the way to smooth bilateral normalization, it led to an outburst of anti-DPRK 
sentiments within Japan, fueled by the media and right-wing politicians, among 
them the eventual prime minister, Abe Shinzo. As Bush toughened the U.S. 
position toward the DPRK and its nuclear program, Koizumi backed away from the 
normalization process while the abductees issue enjoyed daily sensationalization 
by the media, often under explicit instructions from the government.
The abductees issue played into the broadly perceived Japanese shift to the 
right on important historical and cultural issues. The Japanese Ministry of 
Education continued every four years to legitimate textbooks that denied much 
of Japan’s aggression during World War II, that downplayed the signifi cance 
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of forced prostitution (comfort women) to serve the Japanese military, and that 
pushed claims of Japanese sovereignty over Dokto/Takeshima in a variety of 
ways. Koizumi, through his regular and quite public visits to the controversial 
Yasukuni shrine, also tapped into a lodestone of nationalist frustration over 
Japan’s dramatic decline in relative economic power and China’s corresponding 
rise in stature. Unlike Prime Minister Nakasone’s decision to forestall such visits 
in the face of Asian opposition nearly two decades earlier, Koizumi regularly 
spurned the protests of both China and the ROK as attempts to interfere with 
Japanese domestic politics.
The result was a brusque termination of both bilateral and trilateral summits 
among their leaders. Japanese offi cial development assistance to China was 
shifted from multiyear pledges designed to foster infrastructure creation in 
favor of annual allotments directed at environmental protection, increased living 
standards, education, institution building, and technology transfer. And of course, 
as noted above, both China and the DPRK were explicitly identifi ed in Japanese 
defense plans as potential security threats.
Korea
The ROK in the post–Cold War period moved in a very different direction. 
Conservative regimes had dominated Korean politics for the fi rst decade 
following democratization in 1988, and these governments remained largely 
faithful to preexisting ROK security doctrines, including a concentrated focus on 
preparing for potential invasion from the North and maintaining close military 
links to the United States. Economic ties with China improved, but bilateral 
political ties remained frosty. With the election of Kim Dae-jung as president 
in December 1997 and the imposition of the International Monetary Fund’s 
fi nancial constraints following Korea’s monetary crisis in 1997–98, the Korean 
government began a series of systematic moves in a quite different direction. 
Kim used the IMF conditions as a weapon to attack the powerful chaebol and 
to press for industrial deconcentration.
In foreign policy, Kim’s most noteworthy shift was his introduction of the 
Sunshine Policy designed to engage the DPRK economically and to replace 
the ROK’s previously clenched fi st toward the North with a more open hand—
frequently offering unqualifi ed (and, critics would argue, naive) economic 
assistance. In 2000, Kim made a breakthrough visit to Pyongyang, meeting with 
Kim Jong-il, the fi rst visit between the top leaders of the two Koreas since the 
end of the Korean War. The visit led eventually to Kim’s receiving the Nobel 
Prize for Peace, an award tainted by the subsequent revelation that the visit had 
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been made possible by a $500 million payment by the South to the North and 
the failure by the DPRK leader to reciprocate with a promised visit to Seoul.
Meanwhile, although Kim’s Sunshine Policy received the blessings of the 
Clinton administration State Department, the ROK’s relations with the United 
States deteriorated precipitously following the ascent of George W. Bush to the 
presidency. Unlike the friendly personal relations that evolved between Bush and 
Koizumi, those between Bush and Kim got off to a dreadful start during Bush’s 
fi rst telephone call to Kim Dae-jung in February 2001. Despite an extensive 
briefi ng about Kim, Bush demonstrated complete unfamiliarity with Kim’s long-
standing efforts on behalf of his country’s democratization and reunifi cation. 
When Kim began urging Bush to engage North Korea diplomatically, the 
president put his hand over the mouthpiece of the telephone and asked, “Who 
is this guy! I can’t believe how naive he is!” (Pritchard 2007, 52). Relations 
deteriorated further during Kim’s subsequent visit to Washington as Bush began 
what proved to be a complete U-turn away from Clinton’s efforts to improve 
relations with the DPRK, initiating what proved to be the Bush administration’s 
failed efforts to bring about regime change in the North. Secretary of State Colin 
Powell, for example, who indicated a willingness to pick up U.S.-DPRK relations 
from where Clinton had left off, was publicly rebuked and afterward commented 
that he had gotten a little bit too far forward on his skis (Kaplan 2004, 3).
Bilateral links between the United States and the ROK became even worse under 
Kim’s successor, Roh Moo-hyun, who continued Kim’s engagement efforts with 
the North and went further than his predecessor in adopting what he called a 
“balancer” role in Northeast Asia. For Roh, closer ties to China followed logically. 
Normalization between the ROK and China had taken place in 1992, and the 
improvement in ROK ties to China under Kim and Roh began to match the 
growing economic and cultural links between the two, leading to progressively 
warmer ties politically and diplomatically (interrupted notably by the Chinese 
claims to having been historically in control of Koguryo and excising all offi cial 
references to Korean history prior to 1948 on its Web site).
On the occasion of Prime Minister Zhu Rongji’s visit to South Korea in October 
2000, the “South Korea–China cooperative partnership,” which had been 
launched in 1998 during President Kim Dae-jung’s visit to China, was upgraded 
to “comprehensive cooperative ties.” The result was expanded ties in both the 
diplomatic and military arenas, with military visits and exchanges subsequently 
being undertaken. A succession of cordial state visits took place during the Roh 
Moo-hyun years as bilateral ties continued to warm (Park 2002).
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Meanwhile, as Kim and Roh moved to improved ROK-DPRK ties as well as 
links with China, Bush was clearly not interested in any engagement with North 
Korea’s president, Kim Jong-il, the man he dismissively referred to as a “dwarf” 
and someone he “loathed.” Eventually, as is well known, the United States, 
charging the DPRK with maintaining a secret highly enriched uranium program 
for nuclear development, scrapped the existing Agreed Framework for dealing 
with the DPRK. The DPRK responded by evicting International Atomic Energy 
Agency inspectors, ending its commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and 
resuming its plutonium testing (Kaplan 2004). It took considerable time and 
diplomatic effort to begin the so-called six-party talks in 2003, and for roughly 
the fi rst three years of negotiations, there was virtually no real give or take as 
the United States and the DPRK clung stubbornly to fi xed positions, with each 
side essentially demanding nonnegotiable preconditions for the other before any 
other movement was possible. The ROK, while often critical of the DPRK, was 
at least as critical of the United States and often found itself siding with China 
and Russia against the United States and Japan.
U.S.-ROK military ties shifted as U.S. military policies changed. Most centrally, 
the United States reduced its number of troops stationed in Korea by about 
12,500 (roughly one-third of its total) while it also moved its bases back from 
the Demilitarized Zone and Seoul to three key concentrations further to the 
south, thus effectively ending the long-standing trip-wire strategy. Additionally, 
the United States agreed to turn over command of the joint forces to ROK 
military leadership, a decision greeted with mixed emotions in Korea. To many 
it represented a substantial reduction in the U.S. commitment to ROK security. 
To others it involved recognition of the growing importance of ties with China 
and the South’s increasing moves to improve ties to the North. Throughout 
these shifts, ROK domestic politics swirled as two almost evenly matched and 
ideologically antagonistic camps struggled for preeminence.
Bilateral Consequences
Bilateral Japanese-Korean ties went through substantial ups and downs as the two 
countries’ domestic politics became a key driver of vital aspects of the foreign 
relations of both Japan and Korea. Under Kim and Roh it was the political left 
that drove policy changes in somewhat predictable directions for Korea, while 
Koizumi (and to an extent Abe, despite his visits to Beijing and Seoul) was 
pulling Japan toward the political right.
With the election of Lee Myun-bak, an offi cial effort was made to change course 
and improve sagging ties to the United States and Japan. President Lee found a 
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more willing Japanese partner in outgoing Prime Minister Fukuda than earlier 
Korean presidents had found in Koizumi. But it remains to be seen whether 
bilateral ties can continue to improve under the new administration of Aso Taro, 
who has a more nationalistic and right-wing reputation than Fukuda and whose 
principal political concerns have been domestic politics and the lower house 
elections, which must be held by fall 2009.
During the six-party talks, relations between the ROK and Japan were also 
frequently at distant odds. Throughout the process, Korea (along with China) 
continued to push for the most moderate and accommodating positions toward 
the DPRK while Japan and the United States took up opposite positions as 
hard-liners. There was no evidence, however, that the four were playing a good 
cop–bad cop routine. Their differences refl ected deeply held convictions.
Yet the United States began to shift toward a more moderate position following 
the DPRK’s missile and nuclear tests in 2006 as well as the Democratic Party’s 
capture of both houses of Congress in November of that year. This left Japan 
standing alone in hard opposition to the moves being made as the new U.S. 
position saw it much closer to those of the ROK and China. For Japan, driven 
largely by domestic political considerations, the abductees issue remained at 
least as important as denuclearization (along with removal of DPRK missiles 
or at least a cessation of missile tests, which was not really part of the offi cial 
negotiations at all). And Japan refused to withdraw its sanctions or to honor its 
prior promises of economic aid to the North until it received what it called a 
“satisfactory” account of the abductees.
Relations were also damaged by the ROK position on Japan’s effort to secure a 
permanent seat on the UN Security Council. China, of course, has a permanent 
seat on the UN Security Council, and Japan’s efforts have to be seen in the context 
of its emerging competition with China for status and infl uence. Nonetheless, 
Japan’s efforts in 2005 to gain similar representation were successfully opposed 
by China and the ROK as well as by much of Asia (with at best tepid support 
from the United States). Indeed, many Asians, including many South Koreans, 
saw a permanent Japanese seat as simply a second seat for the United States.
The relatively recent Japanese demand for an international adjudication of the 
sovereignty question concerning Dokto/Takeshima has also become problematic. 
For the Japanese Ministry of Defense it is now more or less obligatory to include 
plans for defense of Takeshima in its annual white paper, which in turn catalyzes 
criticisms from the Korean government, which has occupied the islands since 
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the end of World War II. And periodic outbursts of chauvinism from Shimane 
Prefecture about Takeshima as a historical part of the prefecture have been 
equally damaging to bilateral ties.
Such government-to-government problems are unquestionably real and will 
require negotiations and skillful diplomacy. But resolving such problems is 
the standard task of foreign ministry offi cials and elected politicians. Far more 
problematic has been the deterioration in the climate of public opinion in the 
two countries, with waves of anti-Japanese and anti-Korean vehemence bubbling 
up (and periodically being stirred up) in ways that complicate efforts at quiet 
diplomacy. Too frequently, politicians and the media frame the historical issues 
and national differences in terms that reduce the area of potential overlap while 
reinforcing confl ictual understandings of the past. Korean (and Chinese) political 
leaders tend to pick up on any random Japanese politician’s or activist’s remark 
intended for domestic consumption and present it as evidence that Japan is on an 
irreversible path to nationalistic remilitarization (Suh 2007). The consequence has 
been a poisoning of public mutual opinions. Thus, for example, the publication of 
Kenkanryu [Hating Korean wave], a Korea-bashing comic book, was quickly and 
widely reciprocated by the publication of its Korean and Chinese counterparts: 
Hyŏmillyu [Hating Japan wave] and Lun Riben [Discussing Japan] (Seo 2005; 
Suh 2007). In the autumn of 2005, Kenkanryu sold more than 300,000 copies 
within one month of its publication. Its counterparts were as popular in their 
respective countries.
Such a climate of animosity at the popular level (see also data from Inoguchi 
et al. 2005) provides a tempting audience for politicians eager to toss out 
xenophobic red meat. Remarks in one country then easily generate equal and 
opposite reactions in the other, setting off a deteriorating downward spiral of 
comments, the result of which is to further impede the smooth reconciliation of 
complex bilateral differences.
Is there no way out? The fi nal section of this paper acknowledges the power 
of top leaders to negotiate compromises to tough issues. But so much thereby 
depends on personalities. A far more promising long-term solution, I suggest, 
lies in multilateralizing relations between Japan and the ROK in ways that may 
soften the bilateral tensions and bring in potential mediators and changes in 
focus. The result may be a lubrication of otherwise diffi cult-to-resolve bilateral 
frictions.
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III. A Way Forward? Moving beyond Bilateralism
Korean and Japanese leaders have periodically shown an ability to sideline 
vexatious issues and to encourage smoother bilateral relations. Perhaps the best 
example came in 1998 with the Kim-Obuchi summit. The two leaders agreed on 
the common understanding that “in order for Japan and the Republic of Korea 
to build solid, good-neighborly and friendly relations in the twenty-fi rst century, 
it was important that both countries squarely face the past and develop relations 
based on mutual understanding and trust” (MFA-J 1998). Kim promised to assess 
Japan less on past history and more on future behavior. Obuchi in turn offered 
a profound apology to Kim on behalf of the Korean people for the misdeeds of 
the Japanese government and military during the prewar period. Although the 
climate improved quickly as a result, relations deteriorated again during the 
Koizumi years for the reasons noted above.
For that reason, I wish to suggest one important direction offering more hope 
for long-term resolution of current bilateral tensions. The path ahead, I would 
contend, lies in moving beyond ROK-Japan bilateralism on the really sensitive 
and often nonnegotiable issues and shifting them into a multilateral context. 
In effect, change the venue and change the issues. Doing so would allow 
currently vexatious issues to become part of a larger agenda with more than 
two sides participating. Without a doubt, regionalism in Northeast Asia has been 
slow to develop, even compared with embryonic regional tendencies seen in 
Southeast Asia. Moreover, Japan and Korea have approached the abstract goal 
of regionalism with very different end goals in mind (Pempel 2008b; Lee and 
Jae 2007). Nonetheless, at least two bodies provide some possibility for easing 
tensions between Japan and Korea.
The fi rst of these is the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) process. APT began in mid-
1995 and includes the 10 ASEAN countries plus Japan, China, and the ROK 
(Pempel 2008a; Tanaka 2007 inter alia). One of the more encouraging outgrowths 
of the regular meetings of APT has been the opportunity for the “plus three” 
leaders to meet on the sides of the 13-country sessions either bilaterally or 
trilaterally to address issues of common concern. At times when tensions have 
been high, no such meetings were held. But behind the scenes the APT has 
provided an umbrella under which potentially feuding leaders can huddle for 
quiet discussions.
The leaders of South Korea, China, and Japan have held regular trilateral meetings, 
and the three countries have also developed regular ministerial meetings on trade, 
fi nance, communication, and the environment. At the APT meeting in October 
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2003 in Bali, the “plus three” countries issued a joint declaration aimed at 
promoting trilateral cooperation (ASEAN 2003). The declaration pledges further 
cooperation and dialogue on economic, cultural, educational, environmental, 
political-military, and security issues; and the leaders also agreed to set up a 
trilateral committee to promote and implement the cooperative agreements. This 
institutional arrangement, along with the rapid expansion of economic exchanges, 
has laid a strong foundation for trilateral cooperation.
At the seventh summit of the leaders of South Korea, China, and Japan, held in 
Cebu in January 2007 in conjunction with the 12th ASEAN summit, the three 
leaders agreed to expand trilateral cooperation into the political and security 
realms by setting up a trilateral mechanism involving regular consultations 
among senior foreign affairs offi cials. They also expressed a shared desire 
to promote cooperation on trade, investment, and energy; and they agreed to 
initiate trilateral investment negotiations as well. A number of new priorities 
were jointly named for trilateral cooperation, including fi nance, science and 
technology, public health, tourism, logistics and distribution, and youth and 
teenager communications. The leaders agreed to promote cultural exchanges 
in a bid to enhance understanding and friendship among the people of the three 
countries (NIDS 2007). Kyodo News International on 14 January 2007 reported 
also that the three countries would engage in a joint “Year of Cultural Exchanges 
among China, Japan and Republic of Korea” during 2007.
Something of a major breakthrough occurred during the 2007 meetings. All 
three leaders in the “plus three” group agreed to a separate meeting in Tokyo 
during 2008 outside the explicit framework of APT. That meeting was delayed 
until December owing to the resignation of Prime Minister Fukuda, but the 
three leaders eventually met in a historic summit near Fusuoka that focused on 
ways to enhance trilateral cooperation. It also laid the groundwork to become 
a regularized mechanism for minilateral discussions between the top leaders of 
Korea and Japan allowing them to explore a range of nontraditional security 
issues including pandemics, transborder crime, pollution, and the like. The format 
alone hardly guarantees any grand bargains, but it does offer the opportunity to 
link otherwise rather separate issues in ways that might provide windows toward 
more comprehensive approaches to currently troublesome issues.
The second format is the six-party talks. Again, there are no guarantees of 
success. But the current plans in place for resolving the denuclearization of 
the peninsula involve breaking the issues into fi ve different working groups or 
“baskets.” One of the fi ve (chaired by Russia) is tasked with formulating a more 
long-standing architecture for Northeast Asian cooperation. This body would 
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become the logical extension of the six-party process if and when it resolves the 
current outstanding issues surrounding the DPRK nuclear program and mutual 
security guarantees and economic development assistance. Japan and the ROK 
have hardly been close in their moves during the six-party process, so again there 
is no reason to assume that a multilateral forum alone will somehow eradicate 
current bilateral issues. But again, the chances exist for some version of a grand 
bargain or perhaps a concert of powers that, if structured effectively and managed 
carefully, could hold the promise of softening current frictions. Certainly, a new 
architecture for security in Northeast Asia would allow for a dilution of some of 
the currently fractious issues in the larger context of regional security involving 
not just Japan and the ROK but also four neighboring countries, each with their 
own agendas but, potentially, their own solutions.
IV. Conclusion
Since the end of the Cold War, Japanese-ROK relations have been marked by 
competing pulls—oftentimes moving the two countries closer together but at 
other times pushing them widely apart. This paper examines these competing 
pushes and pulls, arguing that the two countries could potentially resolve some 
of their more contentious issues by multilateralizing them. At this stage, East 
Asia has put in place a number of such multilateral bodies. If Korea and Japan 
can transfer some of the more problematic issues from the bilateral agenda that 
so often leaves both countries at dagger points into these multilateral forums, 
there is some hope that the current tensions can be reduced and the issues seen 
in a more comprehensive context that might induce enhanced cooperation.
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